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THE NARRATIVE OF COSTS, THE COST OF 
NARRATIVE 
Alexander A. Reinert† 
 Why is this belief so enduring, when it has never been supported by a single 
empirical study of costs, as opposed to beliefs about costs?1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................121 
I. THE DIAGNOSTIC NARRATIVE: THE ECHO CHAMBER OVERWHELMS THE 
DATA ..........................................................................................................................123 
A. Exploring the Narrative of Runaway Costs ................................................126 
B. The Role of Lawyers’ Professional Practices ...............................................132 
II. UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEDURAL CHANGE ...................................141 
CONCLUSION......................................................................................................................144 
INTRODUCTION 
 Battles over procedure occur on multiple levels. At the most 
granular level, litigants, usually through lawyers, use procedural tools to 
advance their interests in individual cases. At the most abstract level, the 
procedural rules we select are products of a complex balance of 
intersecting and competing interests. 
 This creates predictable problems. At the abstract level, all else 
being equal, there is likely consensus that the best procedural rules are 
those that best ensure just outcomes without being too costly or 
inefficient.2 But there will always be differences of opinion as to the 
substantive content of these values as well as how to balance them. And 
 
 †  Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law. 
 1 Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the Problem of Cost in Federal Civil 
Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 786–87 (2010) (alteration omitted) [hereinafter Lee & Willging, 
Defining the Problem]. 
 2 Rule 1 encapsulates these values, with its focus on justice, speed, and cost. See FED. R. 
CIV. P. 1. 
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even if we can put aside differences about how both to define and weigh 
justice, cost, and efficiency, it is indisputable that at the granular level 
procedural rules offer an opportunity for litigants in individual cases to 
undermine justice, impose unnecessary costs, and foster inefficiency. 
Procedural rules, after all, even ones that depart from the federal 
system’s default choice of trans-substantivity,3 are blind to which party 
to a lawsuit is objectively “right.” And so procedural rules sometimes 
can benefit the strategic litigant at the expense of the deserving one. 
 Judge Victor Marrero’s Article, The Cost of Rules, the Rule of Costs, 
is an attempt to both diagnose and intervene at the abstract and 
granular levels of procedure.4 His diagnosis: too many lawyers use too 
many procedural devices to cause too much inefficiency and impose too 
high cost on the system.5 His prescription: operating at both the abstract 
and granular level, he proposes changes big and small to our procedural 
regime.6 
 Judge Marrero’s observations and suggestions should be taken 
seriously. He has served as a judge for nearly two decades and prior to 
that he had extensive experience as a lawyer in both the public and 
private sector. When a judge with his experience speaks, people will pay 
attention—which is precisely why it is also important to critically engage 
with his article. And while I found some aspects of Judge Marrero’s 
Article compelling, I have serious reservations about his diagnosis and 
some of his prescriptions. 
 In this Article, I will highlight some of my concerns, but they boil 
down to this: in terms of diagnosis, I am simply not convinced that 
Judge Marrero has compellingly demonstrated that in the run of cases, 
our procedural rules are being abused in ways that undermine justice 
and increase cost and inefficiencies. In part, this is a data-driven 
critique—there is little empirical support for the proposition that our 
procedural system is too costly in most cases. But my critique is also an 
attitudinal one. Judge Marrero makes much of the extent to which 
litigants fail—claims that are dismissed, motions that are lost, etc.—and 
finds in these instances proof of unnecessary cost and rampant 
inefficiency. But Judge Marrero’s assessment, I fear, overlooks 
fundamental values that are advanced even when litigants seek legal 
relief and are ultimately unsuccessful.7 Even if one accepts Judge 
 
 3 For a discussion of the trans-substantive approach to procedure, see generally Geoffrey 
C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery Vices and Trans-Substantive Virtues in the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2237 (1989). One notable example where federal law departs form 
trans-substantive procedure is in the area of constitutional litigation on behalf of people 
confined in prisons and jails. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 1997e (2012). 
 4 37 CARDOZO L. REV. 1599 (2016). 
 5 Id. at 1632–42. 
 6 Id. at 1675–91. 
 7 I have covered this topic more extensively in other work. See Alexander A. Reinert, 
Screening Out Innovation: The Merits of Meritless Litigation, 89 IND. L.J. 1191 (2014) 
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Marrero’s diagnosis, some of his prescriptions will create their own 
inefficiencies, and sometimes undermine justice, in ways that Judge 
Marrero does not sufficiently address. 
 This is not to say that everything runs smoothly in every case in 
federal court. Litigants use procedural rules to their advantage 
sometimes unfairly and in ways that create unnecessary burdens on 
courts and others. It is worthwhile to consider ways to address these 
instances; however, one should not confuse anecdotal reports with 
systemic dysfunction, and one should always consider the downstream 
consequences of procedural interventions meant to address both 
individual and systemic problems. 
I.     THE DIAGNOSTIC NARRATIVE: THE ECHO CHAMBER 
OVERWHELMS THE DATA 
 Many critics of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (Federal Rules) 
have a standard account of why reform is necessary. Simply put, the 
liberality of the Federal Rules permits too many insubstantial claims to 
survive and, because discovery obligations are broad, the costs of 
discovery outrun the value of the claims.8 Judge Marrero begins his 
Article by rehearsing this standard account, cataloging the various fora 
in which concerns about rising cost and inefficiency in the federal 
judicial system have emerged.9 The narrative will be familiar to people 
steeped in the history of debates about federal procedure (and it is a rich 
history),10 but Judge Marrero’s goal is different than most. He professes 
some agnosticism about whether indeed the account is accurate.11 But 
where other critics lay the blame for alleged inefficiencies on the 
 
[hereinafter Reinert, Meritless]. 
 8 Many scholars have discussed these arguments in great detail in other work over several 
decades. See Marc Galanter, News from Nowhere: The Debased Debate on Civil Justice, 71 DENV. 
U. L. REV. 77, 83–90 (1993); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, 
and Trials on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
286, 302 (2013); Linda S. Mullenix, Discovery in Disarray: The Pervasive Myth of Pervasive 
Discovery Abuse and the Consequences for Unfounded Rulemaking, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1393, 
1397–1409 (1994) (describing and rebutting arguments about excessive costs); Danya Shocair 
Reda, The Cost-and-Delay Narrative in Civil Justice Reform: Its Fallacies and Functions, 90 OR. 
L. REV. 1085, 1087–89 (2012); Judith Resnik, The Domain of Courts, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 2219, 
2219–20 (1989). 
 9 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1601–08. 
 10 For some examples, see generally Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: 
An Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543 (2014); Brooke D. Coleman, The Efficiency 
Norm, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1777 (2015); Christopher M. Fairman, Heightened Pleading, 81 TEX. L. 
REV. 551 (2002); Arthur R. Miller, From Conley to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60 DUKE L.J. 1 (2010); Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: 
Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494 (1986); Stephen N. Subrin, How 
Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 
135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987); see also sources cited supra note 8. 
 11 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1603–06. 
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liberality of the Federal Rules, Judge Marrero places blame squarely on 
the legal profession.12 The insight that drives Judge Marrero’s Article is 
that accepted tenets of legal practice, informed by law firms’ business 
models, create cost and inefficiency, not the Federal Rules themselves.13 
And because it is so important to his argument, it is the first place I 
pause. 
 There are two essential elements to Judge Marrero’s central theme 
that lawyers, not the Federal Rules, bear responsibility for increasing 
inefficiency in litigation. The first element is empirical—although Judge 
Marrero professes agnosticism about the extent to which inefficiency 
and runaway costs run rampant in federal civil litigation, he needs the 
reader to accept this narrative as empirically rooted in reality to accept 
the heart of his argument. The second element is causal—Judge Marrero 
needs us to accept that lawyers, not the Federal Rules, are the root cause 
of inefficiency and high costs, to accept his prescriptive argument. My 
main goal in this Section is to explain why I remain skeptical of both 
Judge Marrero’s empirical and causal claims, but precisely because 
Judge Marrero could be read as indifferent to whether critics’ standard 
account is based in reality, I first explain why I think he ultimately needs 
readers to accept the standard account to trust the remaining arguments 
made in his Article. 
 As Judge Marrero lays out the standard account of cost and 
inefficiency, he is careful to pepper his narrative with language of 
“perception” and allegation rather than demonstrated proof.14 He 
acknowledges that much of the rhetoric may be heated by “anecdotal 
horror stories and subjective impressions . . . .”15 One might, therefore, 
be left with the impression that Judge Marrero himself is unsure 
whether the standard account is rooted in reality. Judge Marrero, 
however, ultimately takes the narrative of abuse and waste as a given—
speaking of the “historical and statistical record”16 that “convey[s] that 
despite the reformers’ periodic attempts to realize change, the offending 
practices have neither ceased nor abated, let alone improved litigation 
practice over time.”17 
 To be sure, even as Judge Marrero takes the standard account as a 
given, he sources it in a different problem than most critics—not in the 
 
 12 Id. at 1607. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Id. at 1603 (“That perception [of widespread discovery abuse] still underlies much of the 
criticism of court proceedings that regularly arises nowadays from various segments of the legal 
profession.”); id. at 1604 (“Such perceptions have engendered responses and proposals from 
various sources and with shifting focus.”); id. at 1605 (stating that attorneys’ responses to 2009 
Federal Judicial Center study “suggest” that attorneys themselves recognize that they impose 
unnecessary costs through some litigation tactics); id. at 1605–06 (discussing opposing 
perspectives of plaintiffs’ and defense bar at 2010 Duke Conference). 
 15 Id. at 1606. 
 16 Id. at 1632. 
 17 Id. at 1606–07. 
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liberality of the Federal Rules, but the “things many attorneys 
themselves do, omit to do, or condone in the course of everyday practice 
that directly produce the excess and magnify the unpleasantries of 
litigation, and thus that unnecessarily multiply the costs of legal 
services.”18 This is Judge Marrero’s causal argument, but for it to have 
any force, the argument requires that the reader accept the standard 
narrative of runaway costs in federal civil cases. 
 In many ways, I think Judge Marrero’s message is one worth 
communicating—lawyers, a self-regulating profession, should take 
responsibility for our own excesses. Changing the Federal Rules may not 
help matters if we do not change professional practices that create 
perverse incentives. As Judge Marrero observes, nothing in the Federal 
Rules obligates attorneys to file frivolous complaints or baseless 
motions, nor to make “abusive demands for discovery.”19 But in the 
same breath, Judge Marrero glides over the question of how real these 
problems are, referring to abuses that “lawyers themselves complain are 
now commonplace” or to “extreme methods” which, according to 
“critics’ accounts,” have become “virtually obligatory in much litigation 
today.”20 These are forceful accusations. In the end, although Judge 
Marrero talks in the language of “perception” and acknowledges that 
much of the rhetoric may be overblown, his premise is that “the justice 
system, like a boat running against a strong current, has been waging a 
losing battle.”21 I will spend the rest of this Section demonstrating why I 
think, putting aside Judge Marrero’s different take on causation, his 
acceptance of the standard account is problematic. I will then turn to 
why I believe the additional evidence he relies upon to bolster his causal 
argument is insufficient to carry the day. 
 At the outset, I think a personal confession is in order. In the nearly 
two decades that I have worked as a lawyer, I have almost always 
represented plaintiffs in civil rights cases. The lawyers on the other side 
of the “v” in my cases have almost always been better resourced public 
agencies or large law firms. To the extent that much of Judge Marrero’s 
Article reads as a critique of the business model of large law firms, I 
might be one of the last people expected to step in and question the 
critique. But the procedural battles of the past several decades are often 
driven by narratives that appear neutral on their face but obscure the 
underlying stakes and interests.22 This makes for an unhealthy dialogue 
 
 18 Id. at 1632. 
 19 Id. at 1642. 
 20 Id. 
 21 Id. at 1607–08; see also supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 22 As just one set of examples, the presumptive limits on discovery devices such as 
depositions and interrogatories were proposed as a way to reduce costs and abuse across the 
board. See Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
and the Federal Rules of Evidence, 137 F.R.D. 53, 104 (1991) (“The information explosion of 
recent decades has greatly increased the potential cost of wide-ranging discovery and thus 
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about procedure that raises the specter (and sometimes reality) of 
interest-group lobbying rather than principled decision-making.23 
A.     Exploring the Narrative of Runaway Costs 
 It is fair to say, as Judge Marrero points out, that almost from their 
inception the Federal Rules have prompted debate and criticism about 
how well they balance justice, efficiency, and timeliness.24 But these 
critiques are often anecdotal, impressionistic, and, in many cases, 
conscious attempts to tilt the playing field one way or another in the 
absence of hard empirical evidence. Judge Marrero finds, however, that 
simply the existence of anecdotal reports and complaints is verification 
enough of a problem: 
Even to the extent that it is merely based on anecdotal horror stories 
and subjective impressions, what lawyers relate about litigation abuse 
and attendant costs suggests that the underlying issues are real and 
substantial, and that their impacts not only reach the front lines of 
everyday law practice, but penetrate much farther so as to unsettle 
the very foundation of our justice system.25 
 This logic is reminiscent of comments made by Judge Paul V. 
Niemeyer in 1998, who repeated the then-prevailing account that 80% 
of costs of a case are attributable to discovery, even while acknowledging 
that there was no empirical data in support of the claim.26 For Judge 
Niemeyer, “the fact that the claim was made and is often repeated by 
others, many of whom are users of the discovery rules, raises a question 
of whether the system pays too high a price for the policy of full 
disclosure in civil litigation.”27 One cannot fail to think of the Bellman 
in Lewis Carroll’s poem, who declared three times that he and his crew 
had found “‘just the place for a Snark! I have said it thrice: What I tell 
 
increased the potential for discovery to be used as an instrument for delay or oppression.”). But 
limiting discovery tends to favor those with access to information, usually defendants over 
plaintiffs. As Judith Resnik has observed more generally, “[i]n short, we do not all suffer the 
civil rules equally.” Resnik, supra note 8, at 2225. 
 23 See, e.g., Scott Dodson, A Negative Retrospective of Rule 23, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 917, 935 
(2017) (describing how procedure has become “increasingly polarized and politicized”); Linda 
S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of 
Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 844–56 (1991) (discussing interest group lobbying in multiple 
procedural contexts); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: 
Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REV. 529, 542–45 (2001) (discussing the “ideological and 
distributional battle” behind different procedural reform proposals). 
 24 See, e.g., Lee H. Rosenthal, From Rules of Procedure to How Lawyers Litigate: ‘Twixt the 
Cup and the Lip, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 227, 228–30 (2010) (describing the history of criticism of 
federal rules of procedure). 
 25 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1606. 
 26 Paul V. Niemeyer, Here We Go Again: Are the Federal Discovery Rules Really in Need of 
Amendment?, 39 B.C. L. REV. 517, 518 (1998). 
 27 Id. 
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you three times is true.’”28 
 But the leap from anecdotal reports to concluding that there is a 
real and substantial problem to be solved is a dangerous one. Procedural 
reform has more and more been driven by interest groups, who have a 
particular incentive to put forward narratives about the impact of 
procedural rules.29 Many years ago, Richard Marcus responded by 
arguing for neutrality, or at least as much neutrality as can be hoped for: 
In some instances those who seek to advance their interests through 
civil litigation reform are overt about what they are doing, but many 
who seek advantage through reform proposals do not act so 
transparently. Thus, skepticism about hidden agendas sharpens our 
antennae as we scrutinize arguments phrased as neutral. This is a 
proper attitude to take toward much of the litigation crisis bombast 
that has become so common in the last ten years. Though it is 
phrased in general terms and purports to further neutral interests of 
society or the court system, in the hands of many this rhetoric seems 
to be narrowly gauged to serve the interests of a certain sector.30 
 The narrative of discovery and litigation abuse is generally driven 
by defendants, particularly those in particular kinds of cases. The history 
has been recounted at various times by others, and I will not repeat it 
here.31 Suffice to say, it has been supported by questionable empirics.32 
Careful empirical work that rebuts the narrative rarely receives 
attention, for reasons beyond the scope of this author and this Article. 
But for decades, researchers, including those at the Federal Judicial 
Center, have provided data that undermine the narrative only to see 
overheated rhetoric about runaway costs take over and motivate 
reforms.33 
 
 28 LEWIS CARROLL, THE HUNTING OF THE SNARK 3 (1876) (quoted in Parhat v. Gates, 532 
F.3d 834, 848–49 (D.C. Cir. 2008)) (alteration omitted). 
 29 See Resnik, supra note 8, at 2219–20 (“I believe we cannot and should not ignore the 
political content and consequences of procedural rules. Over the last decade, a variety of 
powerful ‘repeat players’ have sought, sometimes openly, to influence ‘court reform’ efforts. By 
and large, that work has been done not by letters written to the Advisory Committee on Civil 
Rules, but rather by lobbying efforts directed towards legislatures and the public, by well-
financed media campaigns, and by support for conferences and meetings to address and 
describe the ‘litigation crisis.’ However appealing might be the notion that writing the Rules of 
Civil Procedure (in contrast to the Rules of Criminal Procedure) is a ‘neutral’ task with diverse 
consequences on anonymous and interchangeable civil plaintiffs and defendants, that 
description is no longer available. ‘Tort reform,’ among other events of the last decade, has 
denied us the refuge of a comforting image.”). 
 30 Richard L. Marcus, Of Babies and Bathwater: The Prospects for Procedural Progress, 59 
BROOK. L. REV. 761, 772 (1993). 
 31 See generally Elizabeth G. Thornburg, Giving the “Haves” A Little More: Considering the 
1998 Discovery Proposals, 52 SMU L. REV. 229, 243–49 (1999). 
 32 See, e.g., id. at 244–45 (recounting the figure trotted out by Judge Paul V. Niemeyer that 
discovery “accounts for 80 percent of litigation costs”) (quoting Niemeyer, supra note 26, at 
518). 
 33 Id. at 246–48 (summarizing studies). 
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 The importance of calling out the erroneous, data-free assumptions 
behind this rhetoric should not be overstated. As many commentators 
have observed, some of the most effective anti-litigation procedural 
doctrine has been fed by a narrative about abuse and out of control 
costs.34 Accepting the narrative as a given perpetuates myths that 
interfere with a balanced discussion about procedural choices.35 To the 
extent there are hard empirical data, they suggest that discovery abuse is 
focused on a small subset of cases on the federal docket, while the 
procedural reforms prompted by this narrative tend to have greater 
impact in the very cases that do not support the discovery abuse 
narrative.36 The extreme cases drive the narrative and prompt reforms, 
and the impact of the reforms will be felt most in the cases in which 
there are minimal discovery costs. 
 Indeed, Judge Marrero uncritically cites Arthur Miller, a leading 
author in this area, as if Miller subscribes to the litigation explosion 
myth,37 even though, in the article cited by Marrero, Miller makes clear 
his view that the myth is mostly perception and assumption rather than 
a data-driven conclusion: 
The foregoing shows that the supposed litigation crisis is the product 
of assumption; that reliable empirical data is in short supply; and that 
data exist that support any proposition. Thus, one should be cautious 
and refrain from trumpeting conclusions on the subject lest it 
distract us from serious inquiry. Yet despite the lack of a solid 
foundation for it, the perception of a “litigation explosion” or 
“liability crisis” drives the “reform” movement.38 
 If much of the debate is prompted by strategic attempts to 
influence the rule-making process, which as many have observed has 
become highly politicized and tilted towards defense interests, then one 
should be very careful about concluding much from bellyaching on 
either side about the supposed excesses and abuses from opposing 
counsel. Take, for example, the 2009 report by the American College of 
 
 34 Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, Braking the Rules: Why State Courts Should Not 
Replicate Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 501, 
520–21 (2016) (“A majority of the Supreme Court’s pleading, summary judgment, class action, 
compulsory arbitration, and justiciability jurisprudence, starting in the 1980s, has been 
similarly influenced by a mindset that assumes, without empirical support, that civil litigation is 
in some sense ‘out of control’ and infused with discovery abuse.”). 
 35 Id. at 520. 
 36 Stephen N. Subrin & Thomas O. Main, The Fourth Era of American Civil Procedure, 162 
U. PA. L. REV. 1839, 1850–51 (2014) (“Thus the cases where discovery abuse is most likely are 
also least likely to be constrained by the new discovery rules. Meanwhile, cases in which there is 
little or no discovery will suffer the additional transaction costs.”); Thornburg, supra note 31, at 
248–49. 
 37 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1604 n.9. 
 38 Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” “Liability 
Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 996 (2003). 
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Trial Lawyers (ACTL),39 cited by Judge Marrero and often held up by 
critics of liberalized procedure as proof that our procedural system 
perpetuates waste and inefficiency.40 Methodologically, the survey lacks 
some of the telltale indications of empirical rigor—the sample of lawyers 
was biased (three-quarters of respondents represented defendants 
exclusively or primarily), and not particularly experienced in federal 
litigation (fewer than 20% litigated in federal court).41 There are, in fact, 
no findings that are specific to federal court or federal procedure.42 The 
“data” are impressionistic and anecdotal, exactly the kind of vague 
interest-group driven rhetoric one should be cautious about 
instantiating into law. Judge Marrero’s quotation from the report is 
consistent with this impression.43 And notably, the proposals contained 
within the report are literally a grab-bag of defense-friendly procedural 
changes (making proportionality central to discovery, shifting from 
notice pleading to fact pleading, etc.).44 And the report’s most 
“radical”—by its own account—proposal would cut plaintiffs’ cases out 
at the knees, especially in those kinds of cases where there is 
informational asymmetry (such as civil rights or employment 
discrimination claims): providing only “limited additional discovery” 
solely upon a showing of “good cause and proportionality” after the 
parties provided anemic initial disclosures.45 
 Indeed, the weight of empirical evidence suggests that many of the 
complaints are apocryphal rather than data-driven. Thanks to research 
conducted by the ablest of researchers, what we know is that discovery 
costs are not disproportionate in the vast majority of cases.46 The 
Federal Judicial Center’s (FJC) 2009 closed-case study shows that in 
almost all cases discovery costs are modest and proportionate to 
 
 39 AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS & INST. FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AM. LEGAL SYS., 
FINAL REPORT ON THE JOINT PROJECT OF THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS TASK 
FORCE ON DISCOVERY AND THE INSTITUTE FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL 
SYSTEM (2009) [hereinafter ACTL REPORT]. 
 40 Some have characterized the ACTL as carrying water primarily for defense-oriented 
interests in civil cases. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages and 
Legal Pluralism, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1393, 1418 (1993) (describing “tort reform proposals” 
favored by ACTL); James E. Rooks Jr., Will E-Discovery Get Squeezed?, 40 TRIAL 18, 18–19 
(2004) (describing ACTL as an organization that, “while nominally neutral, [is] populated 
largely by corporate and insurance defense counsel”). 
 41 ACTL REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. 
 42 Id. at 2 (discussing results of survey). 
 43 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1603 (“Lawyers depicted discovery proceedings as costing too 
much and having ‘become an end in [themselves],’ as well as ‘impractical in that they promote 
full discovery as a value above almost everything else.’”) (quoting ACTL REPORT, supra note 39, 
at 2). 
 44 ACTL REPORT, supra note 39, at 5–7. 
 45 Id. at 9. The ACTL did recommend a correspondingly “slightly broader” initial disclosure 
rule. Id. at 7–8. 
 46 For a helpful recent summary of the available empirical evidence, see Reda, supra note 8, 
at 1088–89. 
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stakes.47 Just as in 199348 and in 2000,49 when the standard narrative was 
used to argue for cutting back on access to discovery, evidence of 
system-wide, cost-multiplying abuse does not exist. 
 The FJC’s 2009 study, discussed in Judge Marrero’s Article, is 
worth going over in some detail. In late 2008, the Committee on Rules 
of Practice and Procedure asked the FJC to look closely at discovery 
costs in civil cases and to report its findings to the May 2010 conference 
on civil litigation at Duke University Law School.50 To do so, the 
researchers self-consciously designed their research to find cases that 
involved as much discovery as possible. They excluded cases “in which 
discovery and discovery-related issues would be unlikely to occur.”51 
They also eliminated any case that was terminated less than sixty days 
after it had been filed.52 The study therefore likely over-represented how 
much discovery takes place in a typical civil case in federal court. 
 The FJC’s closed-case survey found the median cost of litigation, 
including attorneys’ fees, was $20,000 for defendants and $15,000 for 
plaintiffs.53 These figures came as a surprise to many, particularly 
proponents of reform who had long assumed that litigation costs 
routinely careen out of control in federal civil cases. Just as significant—
and perhaps just as surprising to many observers—were the FJC’s 
findings with regard to the overall percentage of total litigation costs 
attributable to discovery. Discovery costs were reported by plaintiffs’ 
lawyers to account, at the median, for only 20% of the total litigation 
costs; the median figure reported by defendants’ lawyers was 27%.54 
 
 47 EMERY G. LEE III & THOMAS E. WILLGING, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., NATIONAL CASE-BASED 
CIVIL RULES SURVEY: PRELIMINARY REPORT TO THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RULES (2009), http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/materials/08/
CivilRulesSurvey2009.pdf [https://perma.cc/FDY5-VNNZ] [hereinafter FJC 2009 STUDY]; see 
also Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 1, at 771. 
 48 See Mullenix, supra note 8, at 1410–43 (strongly criticizing the “soft social science” 
opinion evidence used by the rule makers behind the 1993 reforms, while noting that the 
findings of the methodologically sound empirical studies did not support the reforms). 
 49 See James S. Kakalik, Deborah R. Hensler, Daniel McCaffrey, Marian Oshiro, Nicholas 
M. Pace & Mary E. Vaiana, Discovery Management: Further Analysis of the Civil Justice Reform 
Act Evaluation Data, 39 B.C. L. REV. 613, 636 (1998) (evaluating the RAND corporation study 
of the 1993 reforms, which found that under that set of rules, lawyer work hours on discovery 
were zero for 38% of general civil cases, and low for the majority of cases); see also id. at 650 
tbl.2.10 (showing that while discovery costs grow with the size and complexity of a case, the 
proportion of total costs they represent does not dramatically increase; the median percent of 
discovery hours for the bottom 75%, top 25%, and top 10% of cases by hours worked were 25%, 
33%, and 36% respectively); Thomas E. Willging, Donna Stienstra, John Shapard & Dean 
Miletich, An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the 1993 Federal Rule 
Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REV. 525, 531–32 (1998) (finding that under the 1993 amendments, the 
median reported proportion of discovery costs to stakes was 3%, and that the proportion of 
litigation costs attributable to problems with discovery was about 4%). 
 50 FJC 2009 STUDY, supra note 47, at 5. 
 51 Id. at 77. 
 52 Id. 
 53 Id. at 2. 
 54 Id. 
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Perhaps most importantly, the reported costs of discovery, including 
attorney’s fees, amounted to just 1.6% of stakes of the case for plaintiffs 
and only 3.3% of the case’s value for defendants.55 This means, of 
course, that in half of all civil cases, the costs of discovery amounted to 
even less than 1.6% of the case’s value for plaintiffs and less than 3.3% of 
its value for defendants. The FJC’s data therefore fail to show that 
disproportionality of discovery costs to the value of a case is a serious 
problem. 
 The FJC’s study also identified characteristics that are associated 
with high litigation costs. The most significant is the amount of money 
at stake in the litigation, with factual complexity highly correlated with 
more expense.56 Law firm economics also have an important impact on 
litigation costs. When other variables are controlled for, law firm size 
alone more than doubles the costs, and hourly billing also tends to make 
costs higher.57 This should not be surprising—that costs are higher with 
larger firms does not demonstrate that those firms unnecessarily gin up 
costs because of their business model. Complex, high-stakes cases may 
be riddled with high discovery costs. Whether these costs are 
unjustifiably high has not been demonstrated. 
 Judge Marrero does not discuss any of these limitations or findings 
from the empirical data. Instead, he slips far too easily from the “smoke” 
of attorney complaints to the conclusion that something is 
fundamentally wrong with our legal system. Sometimes where there is 
smoke there is fire; sometimes there is just smoke and mirrors. 
 And to the extent that Judge Marrero argues that lawyers are 
imposing unnecessary burdens on courts, and therefore the public, it is 
worth noting that filings in federal court have been static over the past 
fifteen years, while a significant percentage of pending cases are 
aggregated in multi-district litigation.58 As civil filings have been 
stagnant, judicial resources have increased—because criminal caseloads 
have increased, however, what this means in practice is that the 
workload of a federal district court appears to have increased very 
modestly over the past thirty years.59 Reflecting this stasis, median 
disposition time has remained basically stable over the past three 
decades.60 Courts are becoming more involved in helping to resolve 
 
 55 Id. 
 56 See Lee & Willging, Defining the Problem, supra note 1, at 783. 
 57 Id. at 784. 
 58 See Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor 
Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 
1765, 1768–72 (2017) (presenting data on filings and MDLs). 
 59 Patricia W. Hatamyar Moore, The Civil Caseload of the Federal District Courts, 2015 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 1177, 1197–98 tbl.4 (reporting a decreased load for civil cases but overall increased 
load of 16% per district judge, when weighted for complexity and when accounting for civil and 
criminal cases). 
 60 Id. at 1199. 
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cases than ever before, but many view this as a feature, not a bug, of our 
procedural system. 
 On the surface, even though Judge Marrero takes a superficially 
agnostic posture on whether the accounts of discovery abuse and the 
like can be credited as accurate depictions of the federal system as a 
whole, his narrative implicitly accepts the standard account. Judge 
Marrero’s main target is lawyers, who he refers to as “the leading 
actor[s] in this drama” because of their “responsibility for rising 
litigation excess produced by professional styles and actions of lawyers 
themselves.”61 It should be obvious that one cannot, on one hand, claim 
indifference to whether reports of discovery abuse are accurate, and at 
the same time say that the real problem lies with lawyers themselves. If 
the claims of abuse are overstated for rhetorical and strategic purposes, 
then there is no need to search for other responsible actors for a 
problem that does not exist—the real problem is feeding the echo 
chamber by repeating defense-oriented talking points without engaging 
with the literature that raises empirical and motivational questions 
behind these talking points. Here, I fear Judge Marrero’s Article 
contributes to the problem. 
B.     The Role of Lawyers’ Professional Practices 
 For those readers who are not convinced by the foregoing, I will 
turn my focus instead on the responsible party Judge Marrero wants to 
bring into the fold: lawyers themselves (and Judge Marrero seems 
focused on a particular kind of lawyer),62 and their role in abusing 
procedural rules to increase costs. Judge Marrero identifies two “forces” 
that are related to this abuse: (1) the “professional attitudes” adopted by 
lawyers; and (2) specific strategic choices lawyers make that create 
inefficiency and delay, and amplify costs.63 
 Judge Marrero relies on two principal sources to support his claim 
that the problems of inefficiency and abuse are driven by lawyering 
practices—empirical data provided to him from the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts and results of a survey conducted by the FJC 
and published in 2010. For reasons I will explain, neither is sufficient to 
support Judge Marrero’s thesis that lawyers are regularly engaged in 
abusive practices that cause unnecessary burdens on courts, opposing 
counsel, and the public. 
 
 61 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1609. 
 62 It is worth noting that Judge Marrero’s description of the legal practice and economy that 
he thinks is responsible for certain ills in our justice system would probably not resonate with 
most small-firm practitioners or non-profit lawyers. His description of changes to legal 
practices and the billing economy seem almost entirely about large corporate law firms. 
Marrero, supra note 4, at 1610–20. 
 63 Id. at 1632. 
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 Taking the 2010 FJC study first, I note that Judge Marrero quotes 
selectively from responses by some lawyers who reported to the FJC that 
lawyering practice was driven in part by fee-generating concerns.64 But 
the FJC authors themselves note at the outset that, although they believe 
their survey is useful for understanding how rules of procedure operate, 
“the comments made in the interviews do not represent a random cross-
section of the views of respondents to the case-based survey.”65 Indeed, 
the comments appear to be from a very small self-selected group of 
people—thirty-five attorneys who either expressed interest in being 
interviewed on their own or who responded to an invitation to a slightly 
larger group of attorneys.66 One does not have to be a sophisticated 
empiricist to know that this is hardly an ample sample size to draw 
conclusions about how the entire federal procedural system is 
functioning. But even if it were, reading the FJC study as a whole, it is 
not clear that it fully supports Judge Marrero’s conclusions. Yes, many 
attorneys reported that billing practices were connected at least in part 
to costs, but mostly in the context of discovery not motion practice.67 As 
discussed below, much of Judge Marrero’s focus is on motion practice, 
primarily motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. In the FJC 
survey, many attorneys did not think that motions to dismiss played a 
large role in generating costs, and as to summary judgment, attorneys 
representing plaintiffs had substantially different views about abusive 
practices as compared to attorneys representing defendants, raising 
questions as to whether the anecdata are truly reliable or simply 
reflective of selective observation or strategic posturing.68 For all of these 
reasons, the FJC’s 2010 study cannot bear the weight Judge Marrero 
places upon it. 
 Second, there is still Judge Marrero’s empirical data, which he 
concludes establishes the wasteful conduct of lawyers who bring 
unsuccessful (or abandoned) dispositive motions to dismiss or for 
summary judgment. Judge Marrero first observes that dispositive 
motions are filed in a substantial portion of cases in federal court 
(litigants file motions to dismiss in 35% of cases and motions for 
summary judgment in 40% of cases).69 He then notes that these motions 
 
 64 Id. at 1634 (citing THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN 
THEIR WORDS: ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL 
LITIGATION 10 (2010)). 
 65 THOMAS E. WILLGING & EMERY G. LEE III, FED. JUDICIAL CTR., IN THEIR WORDS: 
ATTORNEY VIEWS ABOUT COSTS AND PROCEDURES IN FEDERAL CIVIL LITIGATION 1 (2010), 
https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/CostCiv3.pdf [https://perma.cc/PL7F-TTDE]. 
 66 Id. at 1–2. Sixteen of these attorneys primarily represented plaintiffs, twelve primarily 
represented defendants, and seven represented plaintiffs and defendants about equally. Id. at 2. 
 67 Id. at 12–13. In the report’s discussion of summary judgment, most attorneys reported 
that most costs already had been incurred through discovery and there was no discussion of 
summary judgment practices being driven by billing concerns. Id. at 29–33. 
 68 Id. at 29–30. 
 69 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633. 
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“achieve clear, complete victories in only about 20% of the actions.”70 
And he further observes that about almost half (45%) of motions to 
dismiss and almost a third (30%) of motions for summary judgment are 
“withdrawn or abandoned by the parties” before they are resolved by a 
court.71 It is unclear as an initial matter why Judge Marrero takes the 
position that a motion to dismiss or motion for summary judgment that 
is only partially successful results in “no net gains” for the litigant 
bringing the motion.72 
 I will not quarrel with these figures themselves,73 although it is 
always preferable when reporting empirical data unavailable to the 
public that one provides more specifics as to methodology. Assuming 
these figures to be correct, the conclusion Judge Marrero draws from 
them is not, in my opinion, supportable. For Judge Marrero, the fact 
that motions to dismiss achieve a “complete victory” in fewer than a 
third of proceedings “reflect litigation deficiencies.”74 And similar 
results in motions for summary judgment are indicative, in Judge 
Marrero’s words, of a procedural strategy that “produce[s] no net gains, 
and in fact could result in a calamitous setback for the summary 
judgment motion proponents.”75 Judge Marrero ultimately concludes: 
On any given day, therefore, a major part of our courts’ business 
entails unnecessary or avoidable proceedings that cannot be 
satisfactorily explained nor justified on any ground reasonably 
related to advancing the needs of the particular case, any legitimate 
interest of the litigants, or the mission of the justice system.76 
 Here I think it is important to step back and consider the context 
in which successful and unsuccessful litigation activity occurs. For the 
purpose of simplicity, I will identify some predominant tracks on which 
litigation can play out in federal court: 
 
 This is obviously far from the universe of potential case trajectories 
 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. 
 72 Id. at 1667. 
 73 There are other data that suggest that the rate of dispositive motion practice may be 
lower. See JOE S. CECIL, GEORGE W. CORT, MARGARET S. WILLIAMS & JARED J. BATAILLON, FED. 
JUDICIAL CTR., MOTION TO DISMISS FOR FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM AFTER IQBAL 8 (2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/MotionIqbal.pdf [https://perma.cc/H8SZ-ESQP]. It 
appears that Judge Marrero obtained statistics directly from the Administrative Office of the 
U.S. Courts. See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1653 n.109. 
 74 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1653. 
 75 Id. at 1667. 
 76 Id. at 1633–34. 
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and does not take into account pre-litigation settlement or any action on 
appeal. But within these straightforward tracks there are many different 
ways in which parties can seek a court’s intervention in the matter (and 
I read Judge Marrero’s Article as focused primarily on how attorneys 
abuse the federal procedural regime by unnecessarily using practices 
that burden the court with wasteful litigation tactics). From Judge 
Marrero’s perspective, the complaint that is dismissed was wasteful 
because it lacked merit.77 Similarly, the motion to dismiss that fails to 
resolve in a complete dismissal of the plaintiff’s complaint is a waste of 
time and effort and, rather than indicative of good-faith professional 
judgment, is instead a means to gin up litigation costs.78 The same goes 
for motions for summary judgment—a motion that is unsuccessful or 
withdrawn serves no purpose, per Judge Marrero, other than to abuse 
procedural rules and drive up costs.79 And discovery is wasteful in Judge 
Marrero’s world if it takes place in a case that is never tried but 
ultimately settled.80 
 But there are, to my mind, several dimensions along which these 
data do not necessarily line up with these conclusions. First, as an 
empirical matter, there are several unanswered questions posed by these 
data. The general numbers reported by Judge Marrero are not, for 
example, disaggregated according to some critical factors. They are not 
disaggregated by case type along multiple dimensions. For Judge 
Marrero to conclude, for example, that a higher failure rate of motions 
to dismiss is consistent with billing-driven filings, one would expect to 
see higher failure rates when motions to dismiss are brought by large 
firms where billing practices are said to dominate strategic decisions 
more than other firm models. One also would expect the success rates of 
motions to dismiss to be higher in certain kinds of cases (say, civil rights 
claims), when the defendants are represented by public-funded lawyers 
rather than by private counsel.81 But Judge Marrero does not parse the 
data along these lines even though we know that a vast majority of 
litigation in the federal courts is conducted by lawyers who we would 
not expect to have the kinds of perverse profit motives that Judge 
Marrero identifies in his Article. 
 In fact, there are empirical data available that call into question 
Judge Marrero’s assumptions about the relationship between motion 
practice and law firms’ economic models. For example, I conducted a 
study of over 5,000 decisions on motions to dismiss made in the years 
2006 and 2010. The goal of the study was to understand better what 
 
 77 Id. at 1633. 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 1660–62. 
 81 To be clear, one would need to conduct this study within civil rights cases because there 
would otherwise be confounding variables that result in differing success rates. 
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impact the plausibility pleading doctrine might be having on resolutions 
of motions to dismiss, but I reported data that bear on the question 
presented in Judge Marrero’s Article.82 Most pertinent, I examined how 
motions to dismiss were resolved across different case types, some of 
which we would expect to be associated with large firm defense lawyers 
(employment discrimination, antitrust, financial instruments, wage and 
hour, and intellectual property),83 and some of which we would expect 
to be associated with public agency defense lawyers (prison cases and 
civil rights cases).84 If Judge Marrero’s hypothesis that large firms tend 
to file more meritless motions solely to drum up costs were true,85 then 
one would expect a lower rate of success in the former set of cases. But 
the data do not support that conclusion—the highest success rates of 
motions to dismiss in both 2006 and 2010 were found in cases where 
one would expect both billing-driven motion practice and merits-driven 
motion practice.86 Nor do other data, generated by the FJC using a 
different methodology, support Judge Marrero’s hypothesis.87 
 But let us move past these empirical questions to a different 
question: just what can one conclude from lawyers seeking court 
intervention and failing? Judge Marrero concludes that failure equates 
with waste, and waste suggests unnecessary choices driven by economic 
motives rather than good-faith strategy, but this is far from obvious. 
First, people seek judicial intervention for legitimate reasons, even if 
they believe there is a risk, sometimes a high risk, of failure. Start with 
plaintiffs, who bring cases that they might think have a high risk of 
failure for completely legitimate reasons. Sometimes it is because they 
believe that the law is in a process of change. There is only one way to 
create change in a world in which some of our most important law is 
made by courts: bring cases that will, especially on the cusp of change, 
 
 82 See generally Alexander A. Reinert, Measuring the Impact of Plausibility Pleading, 101 
VA. L. REV. 2117 (2015). 
 83 Although I did not specifically code for wage and hour and intellectual property claims, 
they were encompassed by the “other” category of cases in my study. Id. at 2140. 
 84 Id. at 2146 tbl.3. 
 85 See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633–34. 
 86 In 2006, the success rate for motions to dismiss was bunched around 50% in antitrust, 
civil rights, and financial instruments cases. See Reinert, supra note 82, at 2146 tbl.3. In 2010, 
motions to dismiss were most successful in civil rights and financial instruments cases, at 
around 70% for both, with about a 50% success rate in employment discrimination, prison, 
antitrust, and “other” case types. Id. 
 87 See CECIL, supra note 73, at 14 tbl.4 (reporting rates of success in motions to dismiss 
ranging from 60—70% in a variety of case types in both 2006 and 2010). Judge Marrero also 
looks to contested motions for awards of attorneys’ fees to suggest that “litigation excess is real 
and severe.” Marrero, supra note 4, at 1631. But he fails to recognize the serious selection bias 
that is present when looking at these cases—they reflect those cases in which the parties could 
not agree on a reasonable fee without seeking court intervention. There is no reason to believe 
that they reflect a majority or even a substantial portion of cases in which these disputes could 
arise. Id. 
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fail more often than not.88 Change in the law is deeply connected to 
failure in the law. There is perhaps no better example than the line of 
litigation that led to the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of 
Education,89 or, to take more recent examples, the Supreme Court’s 
decisions regarding discrimination against same-sex couples.90 Failure 
paved the way to some of the Supreme Court’s most important 
constitutional decisions. 
 Second, even if plaintiffs do not believe they have a fighting chance 
to change law as announced by courts, they might instead bring a case 
to expose the injustice in legal doctrine, prompting change in other 
contexts.91 Again, so long as plaintiffs have a good faith argument for 
their legal position, there is nothing illegitimate about using courts as 
levers in social movements. As Thurgood Marshall once said about the 
desegregation-era cases, “[t]he greatest gains from this period was the 
public education of school officials, the courts and the general public in 
the lawlessness of school officials . . . .”92 Finally, plaintiffs might bring 
claims because they have been treated unjustly even if the law does not 
recognize this unjust treatment as actionable. Certainly it is preferable 
for plaintiffs to seek relief this way rather than engaging in self-help. 
 And on the other side, defendants might seek legal relief through 
motions to dismiss or for summary judgment for some of the same 
reasons—defendants can try to change the law through these motions 
just as plaintiffs may be trying to change the law through filing 
complaints resting on novel legal theories. Take the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Bell Atlantic v. Twombly93 or Ashcroft v. Iqbal.94 Prior to 
those cases, the Supreme Court had for fifty years rejected attempts by 
defendants to impose heightened pleading requirements in particular 
areas.95 In both Twombly and Iqbal, the defendants had lost in the lower 
courts based largely on the Supreme Court’s prior decisions.96 From 
 
 88 I address this dynamic in full in other work. See Reinert, Meritless, supra note 7, at 1224–
31. 
 89 See id. at 1229 n.223 (discussing litigation leading to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). 
 90 Compare Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015), with Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 
(1972). 
 91 Jules Lobel, among others, has written about this approach to litigation. See, e.g., JULES 
LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA (2003). 
 92 Thurgood Marshall, An Evaluation of Recent Efforts to Achieve Racial Integration in 
Education Through Resort to the Courts, 21 J. NEGRO EDUC. 316, 318 (1952). 
 93 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
 94 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
 95 See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 512–13 (2002) (rejecting heightened 
pleading in employment discrimination context); Leatherman v. Tarrant Cty. Narcotics 
Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 168 (1993) (holding that heightened pleading 
for civil rights claims brought against municipalities is “impossible to square . . . with the liberal 
system of ‘notice pleading’ set up by the Federal Rules”). 
 96 In Twombly, the Second Circuit had reversed the district court’s dismissal of the 
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Judge Marrero’s perspective, what looks like wasteful motion practice 
ultimately led to a change in the law. I am no fan of the Supreme Court’s 
new pleading regime, but I can recognize the role that defense counsel 
played in developing the law by bringing motions that, in the moment, 
were unlikely to succeed. 
 Moreover, the broader problem with Judge Marrero’s critique is 
that it takes an ex post result (the failure of a particular motion) to draw 
a conclusion about the ex ante legitimacy of a decision to engage in a 
particular litigation tool. Even if they are unlikely to advance new legal 
doctrine, defendants might bring motions that have even a high rate of 
failure if the cost of bringing the motion is lower than the value to the 
client of a successful motion multiplied by the likelihood of success of 
the motion. Imagine that filing a motion to dismiss costs $10,000 to the 
client and that it has only a 20% likelihood of success. If discovery costs 
will be, say, more than $50,000, then it makes economic sense for a 
defendant to file the motion. One would of course have to build in other 
potential costs, such as defending a successful dismissal on appeal. But 
the point is that one cannot conclude, simply because we know ex post 
that many motions fail, that it is economically irrational or irresponsible 
ex ante to file a motion. From an economic perspective, it may not at all 
be wasteful (depending on the stakes of the case) to engage in 
dispositive motion practice that is more likely to fail than succeed. 
 Relatedly, even if motions to dismiss or for summary judgment do 
not help to develop the law, they can play an important role in helping 
to resolve a case even when they fail to result in a complete dismissal of 
a complaint. A motion that resolves some of the claims in a case, for 
example, changes the value of the case to both parties.97 By resolving 
uncertainty about some of the claims in the case, the motion has 
clarified the relative strengths of each parties’ position. This is true of 
motions for summary judgment as well.98 
 Motions for summary judgment provide an even more important 
function because, as Judge Marrero observes, much of the work that is 
done preparing a motion for summary judgment is the kind of work 
 
plaintiffs’ antitrust complaint. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2005). In Iqbal, 
the Second Circuit had affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendants’ motions to 
dismiss. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143 (2d Cir. 2007). In the interest of full disclosure, I was one 
of the attorneys for the plaintiffs in Iqbal, and I argued the case in district court, the court of 
appeals, and the Supreme Court. 
 97 See, e.g., Steven S. Gensler & Lee H. Rosenthal, Managing Summary Judgment, 43 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 517, 531 (2012) (discussing ways in which partial summary can narrow issues in cases 
or reduce need for certain discovery). 
 98 As for motions that are withdrawn or abandoned, it is difficult to see what Judge Marrero 
finds to criticize. See Marrero, supra note 4, at 1633. If the parties can spare a court from 
spending time resolving the motion because motion practice in the absence of a judicial 
decision helps to more clearly frame the issues, it is far from clear that the motion represents a 
waste of resources for anyone. 
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that one would need to do to prepare for trial.99 If, as Judge Marrero 
would appear to prefer, the parties instead went straight to trial in some 
cases, it is unclear how that would save anyone time and effort. To 
prepare for trial, parties would have to do much of the same work, 
sifting the record for the discovery critical to their case, connecting the 
legal theories to the evidence adduced through discovery, etc. Of course, 
preparing motion papers takes time apart from sifting the record, so the 
question becomes whether that time is worth the expense given the 
likelihood that at least some of the claims presented in the case would 
have greater clarity after the motion for summary judgment is decided. 
 Moreover, if there is a trial and a judgment, some of the work of 
preparing post-trial motions becomes less arduous having already done 
the work of preparing for summary judgment. After all, the standard for 
a post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law “mirrors” the 
standard on summary judgment,100 and although trial will present a 
slightly different record than was on paper at the summary judgment 
stage, there will nonetheless be substantial overlap. 
 I am perhaps most puzzled by Judge Marrero’s suggestion that 
spending time on discovery only to have a case settle before trial 
represents wasted energy and resources and likely is motivated by 
attorney billing practices rather than principled legal strategy. Judge 
Marrero suggests that most depositions are unnecessary because “the 
testimony they record is geared for trials that rarely take place.”101 
Moreover, according to Judge Marrero, “only small portions of the 
massive records counsel nowadays routinely gather, especially in 
complex cases, are truly essential” to resolving the case.102 He concludes 
with the following question: “For what trials, then, are litigants 
conducting such extraordinary discovery proceedings as a matter of 
customary practice?”103 
 There are several answers to Judge Marrero’s question. First, much 
like his argument regarding failing motions, he conflates ex post 
knowledge with ex ante predictions. It may be clear, after having 
engaged in discovery, that a large portion of it was unnecessary. That is 
 
 99 After all, to prepare a motion for summary judgment, one has to scour the record for the 
evidence most relevant to the matter at hand, determine the vulnerabilities in one’s own claims 
or defenses, and assess the strength of the opposing party’s evidence. See Gary T. Foremaster, 
The Movant’s Burden in a Motion for Summary Judgment, 1987 UTAH L. REV. 731, 734 (“Even 
when a motion for summary judgment is denied, benefits accrue because an exchange of 
information occurs, and the parties may use the information to better prepare their respective 
cases for trial.”); Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE L.J. 
27, 44 (2003) (“By forcing parties to focus on the merits of their positions, and by educating 
parties regarding a suit’s likely value, summary judgment opinions can serve some of the same 
purposes as the settlement conference.”). 
 100 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). 
 101 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1660. 
 102 Id. at 1662. 
 103 Id. 
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different from concluding, prior to seeking discovery, that the attorney 
knows which modes of discovery, which documents, which depositions, 
will or will not be useful to sussing out the merits of a case.104 That, after 
all, is the very purpose of discovery. It would be obviated to some degree 
if there were truly broad mandatory initial disclosures in civil cases, but 
that is a different battle entirely. Second, it is hard to understand why 
Judge Marrero would criticize lawyers for taking discovery and settling 
in the shadow of trial. I take it as a given among trial lawyers that 
discovery is essential to framing settlement. In many cases it is pointless 
to have settlement discussion absent discovery. It hardly strikes me as an 
indication of wasted resources that litigants would take discovery and 
decline to litigate the case to trial. Rather, this is much more likely a 
rational assessment of the costs (mostly in attorneys’ fees) that would be 
incurred should the matter go to trial. And discovery, much like 
decisions on motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, simply 
provides more relevant information to enable parties to accurately 
assess their forward-looking risk. It is, in fact, unclear what Judge 
Marrero believes would be preferable—not have parties take discovery 
and settle in the absence of full information? Or go to trial unprepared 
for the other sides’ case? Or, more troublingly, not balance the power 
dynamic in play when there is informational asymmetry? Indeed, the 
most “radical” and transformative aspect of the Federal Rules might just 
be the mutual discovery obligations they embrace.105 In a world in which 
information is not equally distributed, muscular discovery obligations 
are more likely to ensure that litigants are truly equal before the law. 
 This is not meant to deny, as Judge Marrero notes, that plaintiffs 
sometimes file complaints for illegitimate reasons—to secure coercive 
settlements, to harass or annoy, etc. Nor can it be denied that 
defendants bring motions that are meant to impose unnecessary 
burdens on the other side; or that some lawyers might engage in 
practices that are motivated, in whole or in part, by the desire to pump 
up billing records. And lawyers on both sides can surely be accused in 
some cases of imposing high discovery costs that are disconnected from 
the merits of the case. Judge Marrero’s call for an examination of how 
lawyers use and sometimes abuse our procedural system is perfectly 
appropriate. At the same time, we should not rush to judgment on the 
basis of anecdote or empirics that should be analyzed with more nuance. 
 
 104 In light of this problem, Scott Moss suggests deferring “close decisions on possibly useful 
but costly evidence until meritorious cases separate from the pool.” Scott A. Moss, Litigation 
Discovery Cannot Be Optimal but Could Be Better: The Economics of Improving Discovery 
Timing in a Digital Age, 58 DUKE L.J. 889, 890 (2009). 
 105 George B. Shepherd & Morgan Cloud, Time and Money: Discovery Leads to Hourly 
Billing, 1999 U. ILL. L. REV. 91, 94 (“For the first time, all litigants could force their adversaries 
to provide extensive information about the adversaries’ cases.”); Ezra Siller, The Origins of the 
Oral Deposition in the Federal Rules: Who’s in Charge?, 10 SETON HALL CIR. REV. 43, 91 (2013) 
(describing contemporaneous responses to introduction of Federal Rules). 
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II.     UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF PROCEDURAL CHANGE 
 I finally want to turn to some of Judge Marrero’s proposals for 
change. I think many of them may be worthwhile to consider, but in the 
interest of space I will focus on two that are directed at what Judge 
Marrero believes are systemic problems in our federal civil system: (1) 
the filing of broad blunderbuss complaints; and (2) the filing of 
unnecessary motions for summary judgment. Here, I will raise some 
concerns about potential unintended consequences of Judge Marrero’s 
proposals. 
 With respect to plaintiffs’ complaints, Judge Marrero has several 
suggestions. He proposes that plaintiffs be required to file a verified 
statement as part of their initial complaint “detailing their efforts to 
communicate with the defendants to discuss the dispute.”106 And even 
after doing so, plaintiffs should “begin prosecuting their actions by 
launching the litigation with the best-grounded claims against the most 
definite defendants while holding any other uncertain claims and 
defendants in reserve.”107 As to the first suggestion, it is my experience 
that plaintiffs often send a so-called “demand letter” to defendants in 
advance of litigation, but this is admittedly anecdotal. There is evidence 
that the vast majority of disputes never end up in court,108 which might 
reflect lack of access to legal services, the low stakes of most disputes 
that could be litigated, or pre-filing settlements. But let us assume for 
the moment that, in those cases that are litigated, some or perhaps most 
plaintiffs’ counsel do not already follow the practice of sending demand 
letters. For Judge Marrero’s proposal to do work (assuming one could 
overcome Rules Enabling Act barriers),109 it would have to be true that 
the value of this pre-filing procedure, in increasing pre-filing resolution, 
outweighs the potential costs (including the time spent preparing and 
responding to the demand letters, the risk of putting a defendant on 
notice of the pendency of litigation, and the cost of delay). Given that 
most judges are now encouraged to ask about settlement at the initial 
case conference,110 I am not convinced that the proposal would bear 
fruit. 
 As to the second suggestion, I have more serious reservations. 
Judge Marrero claims in a footnote that the notion of proceeding only 
with the best claims against the “most definite defendants” is “startingly 
 
 106 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1675. 
 107 Id. at 1651. 
 108 Joanna C. Schwartz, What Police Learn from Lawsuits, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 841, 875 
n.185 (2012) (collecting sources suggesting that, across a range of case types, “[m]ost people 
who believe their rights have been violated never sue”). 
 109 The Rules Enabling Act prohibits the adoption of Federal Rules that “abridge, enlarge or 
modify any substantive right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2012).  
 110 FED. R. CIV. P. 16(a)(5), (c)(1). 
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simple,” analogizing the strategy to suing pseudonymously named 
defendants when one is unaware of their identity.111 But he appears to 
overlook the serious statute of limitations problems that would arise 
with this strategy—indeed, those problems are best exemplified by 
claims brought against Doe defendants. In many circuits, including the 
Second Circuit, it is very difficult to “relate back” a complaint filed 
against a Doe defendant after one learns their identity.112 It would prove 
even more difficult to do so for known defendants who a plaintiff 
consciously fails to include in a complaint simply because, at the time of 
filing, her claims against that defendant are not among the “best-
grounded” claims. Moreover, it creates potential prejudice for the 
excluded defendant, who will not be present at discovery proceedings or 
court proceedings, which might affect the contours of a case once the 
defendant is ultimately added.113 Finally, it ignores the problem of 
informational asymmetry by essentially punishing plaintiffs simply 
because they lack full information when we know that in many kinds of 
cases, defendants have superior access to relevant information.114 Given 
the narrowing of discovery from information related to the “subject 
matter” of the litigation to “claims and defenses,”115 it is not even clear 
how a plaintiff would obtain discovery relevant to a putative defendant 
who the plaintiff excluded from the initial complaint under Judge 
Marrero’s proposal. 
 I understand the motivation behind Judge Marrero’s proposals—
plaintiffs’ counsel surely sometimes file “shotgun” complaints against 
too many defendants. The Federal Rules do account for this practice.116 
However, and more importantly, the Federal Rules contemplate that a 
plaintiff need not sue only those defendants against which the plaintiff 
 
 111 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1651 n.107. 
 112 See Barrow v. Wethersfield Police Dep’t, 66 F.3d 466, 469–70 (2d Cir. 1995), modified, 74 
F.3d 1366 (2d Cir. 2016); see also Heglund v. Aitkin Cty., 871 F.3d 572, 580 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(collecting cases). The Second Circuit has limited Barrow’s holding somewhat, holding that 
relation back could occur in some situations involving pseudonymously-named defendants 
when doing so is permissible under applicable state statute of limitations law. See Hogan v. 
Fischer, 738 F.3d 509, 518–19 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 113 Cf. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 685–86 (2009) (noting that even defendants who are 
not subjected to formal discovery demands may be burdened by discovery against other parties, 
because of the need “to participate in the process to ensure the case does not develop in a 
misleading or slanted way that causes prejudice to their position”). 
 114 See Alexander A. Reinert, Pleading as Information-Forcing, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 
32–35 (2012) (discussing informational asymmetry in context of pleading doctrine). 
 115 As originally enacted, the Federal Rules permitted parties to obtain discovery relevant to 
the “subject matter” of the litigation. The 2000 amendments changed this presumption so that 
the scope of discovery was limited to material relevant to “claims and defenses,” permitting 
discovery to be broadened if the requesting party could demonstrate “good cause.” In 2015, the 
“good cause” safety valve was eliminated, meaning that parties could only obtain discovery 
relevant to claims and defenses but not the “subject matter” of the litigation. For a thorough 
discussion of these changes, see generally Adam N. Steinman, The End of an Era? Federal Civil 
Procedure After the 2015 Amendments, 66 EMORY L.J. 1 (2016). 
 116 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). 
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has the best-grounded claims.117 There are costs to this liberal approach 
to pleadings, but benefits as well. 
 Judge Marrero’s suggestions regarding summary judgment 
procedure prompt similar questions and challenges. As I read it, Judge 
Marrero proposes, among other things, having an expedited trial in lieu 
of summary judgment, with the judge making a Rule 50 decision after 
close of the plaintiff’s case in chief.118 Judge Marrero finds support for a 
procedure like this in Rule 52.119 This raises some questions. 
 First, does this mean that the plaintiff’s case will be presented solely 
to the judge so that the judge can make a Rule 50 determination? If so, it 
seems likely that this would create more inefficiencies in terms of costs, 
thereby making the proposal counter-productive. This is for a variety of 
reasons. First, both parties would likely still expend a significant amount 
of energy and time on trial preparation. They would sift through the 
record, prepare witnesses, etc. Indeed, they might end up spending 
more lawyer time (and therefore billable hours) on this procedure than 
on summary judgment. It all depends on how much time attorneys will 
have to spend sifting the record (something one has to do for summary 
judgment as well as for trial) as opposed to preparing motion papers 
(although presumably if this alternative became more common, 
attorneys would start filing written Rule 50 motions that look a lot like 
Rule 56 motions).120 
 Second, the outcome would not necessarily advance the issues. If 
the judge denies the Rule 50 motion, the parties are left in the same 
place as if the judge has denied a motion for summary judgment—and 
now they will have to have a full-blown trial, with jury selection (in cases 
in which there is a jury trial). Assuming that the case has only been 
presented in front of the judge, this will mean going back and repeating 
the plaintiff’s case in chief. If the Rule 50 motion is granted, the parties 
would be in the same place as if the summary judgment motion had 
been granted. And we would expect to see appeals from those grants in 
the same proportion as we now see appeals from grants of Rule 56 
motions. 
 If instead Judge Marrero is proposing that the plaintiff’s case 
should be presented in front of a jury, there are ways in which it could 
both increase and decrease efficiency. Efficiency could be advanced if 
the court denies the Rule 50 motion at the close of the plaintiff’s case. 
Then we have basically eliminated summary judgment by defendants in 
favor of full-blown trials.121 But, again, query how much this has 
 
 117 FED. R. CIV. P. 8(d) (permitting pleading in the alternative and inconsistent pleading). 
 118 FED. R. CIV. P. 50. 
 119 Marrero, supra note 4, at 1678–79 (referencing FED. R. CIV. P. 52). 
 120 FED. R. CIV. P. 50, 56. 
 121 The framers of the Federal Rules originally meant for summary judgment to be used by 
plaintiffs in debtor judgment cases. See Stephen B. Burbank, Vanishing Trials and Summary 
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reduced costs if all of the time spent preparing for trial overlaps with the 
time spent preparing a summary judgment motion. There is no question 
that there is substantial overlap; I take it as an open question as to how 
much overlap there is. 
 Indeed, Judge Marrero’s proposal could lead to greater inefficiency 
if the court grants the Rule 50 motion. In that event, the plaintiff will 
almost certainly appeal and if the plaintiff prevails on appeal, the case 
will be returned to the district court to be tried again. This is why most 
judges almost never grant Rule 50 motions at the close of a plaintiff’s 
case—the cost of being wrong in terms of judicial efficiency is far too 
high. 
CONCLUSION 
 Narratives matter. They capture our imagination and spur us to 
action. They can lead us astray as surely as they can lead us to water. For 
decades, rising costs and inefficiency has been one dominant narrative 
in procedural debates. Judge Marrero’s Article helpfully asks us to focus 
on the role of the lawyer and law firm economics in assessing how to 
solve waste and abuse in civil litigation. But it also reinforces a narrative 
that, in my view, obscures some of the nuance in procedural reform. In 
this brief Article I have highlighted points of contention based both on 
data and on concerns about unintended consequences. 
 At the same time, I am confident that some of Judge Marrero’s 
prescriptions are surely sensible whether or not they are supported by 
sophisticated empirical evidence. And some procedural problems will 
not be amenable to data-based inquiry. Sometimes we will have to be 
satisfied with fumbling towards the right procedure through experience. 
 
Judgment in Federal Civil Cases: Drifting Toward Bethlehem or Gomorrah?, 1 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 591, 592 (2004). It has expanded to be used almost exclusively by defendants, 
which was not the apparent intent of the drafters of the 1938 Amendments. 
